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Abstract 
In this paper we analyze a time series measuring the monthly flow of US tourists 
to Israel over the period 1997-2006. We pay particular attention to the response 
of tourists to variations in the intensity the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, drawing a 
distinction between actual conflict intensity and the intensity with which the 
conflict is reported in the US television media. We find that different 
dimensions of the conflict affect tourists in different ways. For some (but not all) 
dimensions of the conflict, reported intensity matters more than actual intensity. 
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1. Introduction 
This paper analyses the impact of the media on US tourist decisions about whether to travel to 
Israel. It draws on two strands of economic thought. The first relates to media influence on the 
perceived risk associated with potentially dangerous activities. Individual households may 
have imperfect information about the risks associated with, for example, eating certain kinds 
of food or visiting certain neighbourhoods. When information is costly, they may use the 
intensity of media coverage of a hazardous activity as an indicator of the level of risk 
involved, interpreting intense media interest as a sign of concern among those who are better 
informed. Alternatively, we might abandon strict economic rationality in favour of the 
psychological model of Tversky and Kahneman (1973), in which the frequency with which 
events of a certain type come to mind conditions the perceived frequency of such events in 
everyday life. More intense media coverage of dangers increases their perceived frequency, 
regardless of the true risks involved.1
 The importance of the media in conditioning perceptions is well documented in 
several areas of economics and other social sciences. Criminologists have used household 
survey data to examine the extent to which the intensity of coverage of violent crime on 
television news channels affects the perceived risk of being a victim of crime. The hypothesis 
that the television news media condition people’s perceptions – know as “cultivation theory” 
– dates back to Gerbner and Gross (1976). Recent studies provide substantial evidence for the 
importance of news coverage of crime in conditioning perceptions. Romer et al. (2003) 
analyse data from the US General Social Survey to show that individuals’ perceptions of the 
frequency of crime, conditional on a range of socio-economic characteristics, depend not only 
on actual crime in their locality, but also the intensity of crime reporting in the local television 
media. This evidence is reinforced by more detailed surveys of individual cities, showing that 
people watching more television news perceive there to be a higher level of violent crime, 
ceteris paribus (Romer et al., 2003; Gross and Aday, 2003; Chiricos et al., 1997). 
 The focus of attention in criminology is on respondents’ self-reported perceptions of 
risk. There is, as far as we are aware, no evidence on the extent to which television reports of 
violent crime affect people’s behaviour. However, there is econometric evidence that media 
reporting of health risks has a direct impact on consumer behaviour. Verbeke and Ward 
(2001) analyse time-series data on Belgian meat consumption during the period of the BSE 
crisis; they show that demand for beef was highly sensitive to time-series variations in the 
intensity of media reports about the risk of BSE. Other studies reporting a significant media 
effect on demand for food during health scares include Mazzochi (2004) and 
Kalaitzandonakes et al. (2004). In some papers, for example, Piggot and Marsh (2004), the 
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authors note that the media effect is economically and statistically significant, but short-lived. 
One interpretation of these results is that media reports produce a Tversky-Kahneman effect, 
but one that lodges only in people’s short-term memory. However, the results are also 
consistent with rational consumers who assume that journalists are better informed about 
short-term variations in the level of risk. 
 The second strand on which we draw (a large part of which is reviewed by Frey et al., 
2004) relates to the economic consequences of violent conflict. Much of the politically 
motivated violence in the modern world takes the form of low-intensity conflict which might 
not disrupt economic production in any substantial way. However, it can still have substantial 
demand-side effects, especially when tourism is a major export industry, with consequences 
for the financial sector (Eldor and Melnick, 2004). Evidence for the effect of political 
violence on the tourism sector is reported in Enders and Sandler (1991) for Spain, Enders et 
al. (1992) for Austria, Italy and Greece, Drakos and Kutan (2003) for Greece, Israel and 
Turkey and Sloboda (2003) for the USA. In related work, Drakos (2004) examines the effects 
of 9/11 on various airline companies. One paper that focuses explicitly on Israel is Fleischer 
and Buccola (2002). This paper shows that foreign demand for tourist accommodation is 
particularly sensitive to violence in the region, whereas local demand is quite insensitive; 
these effects are reflected in local financial markets. 
 Such papers provide rigorous and compelling evidence on the effects of political 
violence on tourism. However, they leave one key issue unresolved. To the extent that they 
employ accurate measures of conflict intensity, rather than the intensity with which the 
conflict is reported by the popular media, they do not directly address the role of the media in 
conditioning perceptions of risk.2 In order to analyse the role of the popular media, we need to 
distinguish between the impact of actual violence on tourists’ decisions and the impact of 
reported violence, as in the criminology literature. Our paper addresses this issue using 
monthly tourism and conflict intensity data for Israel during the most recent Israeli-
Palestinian conflict (the Al Aqsa Intifada, beginning in October 2000), and corresponding 
television media data from the United States. While not a full-scale civil war, the Intifada 
represents a continuous ongoing conflict, rather than a series of isolated conflict events. 
 
2. The Structure of the Empirical Model3
Appendix 1 explains the choice-theoretic framework from which we derive the regression 
equations used to test hypotheses about the causes of monthly variations in the volume of 
tourist flows from the US to Israel. Our regression equations are of the form:  
 
β (L) ln(TISt /TEUt) = Α (L) Xt + Σs θ s · hst + φ 1 · PSt + φ 2 · NYt + εt      (1) 
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TISt represents the number of US tourists visiting Israel in month t; TEUt is a scale variable, 
measuring US tourist flows to a relatively safe location, Europe. Later, we will explore the 
sensitivity of our results to using an alternative scale variable. Xt represents a vector of time-
varying factors that might impact on the relative attractiveness of Israel as a tourist 
destination, including indicators of both actual and reported violence. β (L) is a lag 
polynomial operator capturing persistence in tourism flows. Α (L) is a vector of lag 
polynomial operators capturing lagged effects in X. εt is a regression residual. The other 
elements of equation (1) capture seasonal effects: hst is an intercept specific to month s of the 
year, PSt is a dummy variable for the occurrence of Passover in month t and NYt a dummy 
variable for the occurrence of the Jewish New Year.4
Our dependent variable is constructed from two data sources. Monthly Israeli tourism 
data are published by the Central Bureau of Statistics and are available online at 
www.cbs.gov.il. The data used to measure TISt are those for the number of Americans 
checking into tourist hotels.5 One alternative data source is the number of Americans recorded 
entering Israel by the customs service. However, in 2001 the Israeli customs service changed 
its definition of “American” from US resident to US passport holder, so we cannot use 
customs data to measure US tourist flows for whole of the Intifada period. For the scale 
variable TEUt we use monthly figures from the dataset published by the ITA Office of 
Tourism and Travel Industries (http://tinet.ita.doc.gov), which reports the number of 
American tourists departing for Europe. 
The hotels data are available from January 1996, and Figure 1 depicts the            
ln(TISt /TEUt) series constructed using these data for the period January 1996 – June 2006. 
(The figure also incorporates some trend lines to be discussed later.) It can be seen that there 
is a pronounced dip in ln(TISt /TEUt) after the onset of the Intifada in October 2000, but that 
Israeli tourism slowly recovers toward the end of the sample period, when there is some 
diminishment in the intensity of the conflict. It is not clear whether this time series is 
stationary; stationarity test statistics are discussed in the next section.  
 
Figure 1 and Table 1 here 
 
In the results section below, we present five alternative models, each incorporating a slightly 
different set of variables in the X vector; the full list of models is presented in Table 1. These 
variables reflect different dimensions of the conflict, both actual and reported. Model 1 
includes two reported conflict intensity series. These are constructed from the Reuters Factiva 
database, which records daily transcripts from the main US television news shows from 
January 1997 onwards. The three most popular shows are the NBC Nightly News, CBS 
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Evening News and ABC World News Tonight. Our main results are based on the World News 
Tonight data. The comparison of our main results with the alternatives – using other news 
shows instead of World News Tonight, or aggregating over different shows – is discussed 
later. From the Factiva database we construct two monthly time series: PALWNT and IFKWNT. 
The first measures the number of conflict-related Palestinian fatalities reported on the news 
show, and the second measures the number of Israeli and foreign fatalities. The two times 
series exclude repeat coverage of the same fatalities and retrospective coverage of events that 
took place months earlier, for which separate time series can be created, as discussed later.  
Corresponding to PALWNT and IFKWNT are the series PALNRP and IFKNRP, the totals for 
monthly Palestinian and Israeli fatalities not reported on World News Tonight. These series 
are constructed from actual fatality data published by the human rights organisation B’Tselem 
(www.btselem.org).6 There is very little discrepancy between the B’Tselem data and other 
official sources, such as the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) website, www1.idf.il, or the 
Palestinian Red Crescent Society website, www.palestinercs.org. Indeed, the actual figures 
correspond very closely to the numbers that would be produced from a careful reading of a 
serious newspaper such as the Jerusalem Post, or even the New York Times. If tourists base 
their decisions on information in the quality media then there will be no cultivation effect 
from the television media, and the effect of PALWNT (IFKWNT) on tourist flows should be no 
different from that of PALNRP (IFKNRP).  
A higher number of casualties among Israelis and foreign visitors represents a direct 
threat to tourists, and for this reason it may reduce tourist numbers. However, this effect may 
be mitigated if a higher level of casualties evokes more sympathy for Israelis and prompts 
more of the “solidarity” tourism promoted by US groups such as United Jewish Communities. 
Palestinian casualties represent less of a direct threat to tourists, but they may increase the 
perceived level of threat, if there is a perception of a “cycle of violence” in which higher 
Palestinian casualties now lead to a greater threat to tourists in the immediate future. Jaeger 
and Paserman (2005) find no evidence for such a cycle, but there might still be a perception 
that such a cycle exists. (Moreover, even a statistically literate tourist is likely to be more 
concerned with Type II errors than with Type I errors when evaluating the null that there is no 
such cycle.) Alternatively, a rise in Palestinian casualties could prompt tourists sympathetic to 
the Palestinian cause to boycott Israel, as promoted by US groups such as the Palestine 
Solidarity Movement. Moreover, if tourists have to avoid areas where Palestinian casualties 
occur (for example, Bethlehem) then their vacation as a whole may be less enjoyable.  
The four time series, PALWNT, IFKWNT, PALNRP and IFKNRP, all appear to be 
approximately log-normally distributed, although all four are sometimes equal to zero, 
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especially before the onset of the Intifada in October 2000. For this reason, Model 1 
incorporates them in the X vector as ln(1 + PALWNT), ln(1 + IFKWNT), ln(1 + PALNRP) and     
ln(1 + IFKNRP). These four series are depicted in Figure 2. Table 2 lists correlation 
coefficients for the four variables. There is a moderately high correlation between              
ln(1 + PALWNT) and ln(1 + IFKWNT), as there is between the corresponding non-reported 
fatality series. However, correlations between the reported and non-reported series are much 
smaller: the short-run variation in reported conflict events is not a particularly accurate 
reflection of what is happening on the ground. Moreover, all of the correlation coefficients 
drop markedly when we restrict our attention to the high violence period, 2001-2004.  
It can be seen from Figure 2 that the peak of the violence is in March 2002, when 
there were 12 suicide bomb attacks (the next highest number is five). March 2002 is highly 
atypical of the rest of the period; at such high levels of violence the response of tourism could 
exhibit non-linearities not seen at other times, and for this reason Model 1 includes a dummy 
variable for this month. It can also be seen that the onset of the Intifada in October 2000 
constitutes a definite structural break. At the time, tourists may well have wondered whether 
Israel was going to descend into a full-scale civil war. For this reason, Model 1 includes a 
dummy for October-November 2000.  
Finally, we must recognise that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is reported in the 
context of a high level of violence across the region, particularly in Iraq. The Iraqi conflict has 
been reported virtually every day in the American media since the invasion of February-
March 2003, but we do not include a variable for the number of casualties reported in Iraq. It 
is unlikely that tourists perceive there to be a high correlation between Iraqi violence 
(trending upwards over 2005-6) and Israeli violence (trending downwards over 2005-6). 
Nevertheless, at the onset of the Second Gulf War in February-March 2003 tourists may have 
perceived there to be some risk of a retaliatory attack on Israel. For this reason, we include a 
dummy variable for these two months. 
 
Figure 2 and Table 2 here 
 
Model 2 is a minor modification of Model 1. Because we are using logarithmic 
transformations, a model with reported and non-reported fatalities is not identical to one with 
reported and total fatalities. In order to check whether our results are sensitive to this 
difference, Model 2 replaces the two non-reported fatality series with one for total Palestinian 
fatalities, ln(1 + PAL), and one for total Israeli fatalities, ln(1 + IFK). In the absence of any 
cultivation effect, the reported fatality series should be statistically insignificant in this model. 
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One potential criticism of Models 1-2 is that they do not disaggregate Israeli and 
foreign fatalities. In Models 3-5 we consider alternative forms of disaggregation. First of all, 
in Model 3, we distinguish between Israeli and foreign fatalities occurring in the West Bank 
and Gaza (IFKWBG) and those occurring west of the Green Line (IFKISR). Fatalities in the West 
Bank and Gaza may represent less of a threat to tourists than fatalities elsewhere, because 
Palestinian areas locations are easy to avoid. (Tourist numbers in West Bank towns such as 
Bethlehem have fallen almost to zero since the start of the Intifada.) On the other hand, it is 
possible that a reduction in tourism following a rise in Israeli casualties is partly offset by a 
solidarity effect among those with high level of political sympathy for the State of Israel. If 
casualties among Israeli settlers evoke less sympathy than casualties elsewhere, then the 
settler casualty coefficient may be greater in absolute value. Therefore, we do not have any a 
priori view on the relative sizes of the two coefficients. 
In Models 4-5 we distinguish between Israeli and foreign fatalities caused by suicide 
bomb attacks and fatalities caused by other types of attack. Suicide bomb attacks typically 
target a particular public location, but many other types of attack target specific individuals. 
Possibly, tourists perceive the former to represent a greater threat than the latter. Model 4 
replaces IFK with IFKSUI (the number of Israeli and Foreign fatalities in suicide bomb attacks) 
and IFKOTH (the number of Israeli and Foreign fatalities in other attacks). Model 5 uses the 
number of suicide bomb attacks (NSU) instead IFKSUI. If the number of fatalities in a 
particular attack is perceived by potential tourists to be largely a consequence of chance, then 
the number of fatalities matters less than the number of attacks. 
There are two obvious omissions in Models 1-5. First of all, we do not disaggregate 
according to both the location of the attack and the type of attack. As can be seen in Table 2 
above, there is a very high correlation between ln(1 + IFKSUI) and ln(1 + IFKISR), as there is 
between ln(1 + IFKOTH) and ln(1 + IFKWBG). In practice, the majority of suicide bomb attacks 
are west of the Green Line, and the majority of other attacks on Israelis are in the West Bank 
and Gaza. If we disaggregated fatalities any further, then the t ratios would exhibit a large 
downward bias, preventing any sensible inference from the model. Secondly, we do not 
disaggregate reported fatalities in the same way as actual fatalities. In order to see why, 
consider the following transcript of a typical World News Tonight report from the 4th March 
2002, which follows a description of IDF attacks on Palestinians. 
“That follows one of Israel's worst weekends since this conflict began. 21 Israelis dead 
in less than 24 hours. Palestinian groups have been hitting on all fronts. Suicide 
attacks against civilians, shooting attacks against Israeli settlers and soldiers. One 
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Palestinian sharpshooter managed to kill 10 Israelis, including seven soldiers at this 
checkpoint, and then he got away.” 
The report is specific about the total number of Israeli casualties, but vague about the 
proportion occurring in the West Bank and Gaza, and about the proportion occurring in 
suicide bomb attacks. We cannot use this report to construct a precise disaggregation of 
Israeli fatalities, and nor could the potential tourists who originally watched it.  
 
3. Regression Results 
3.1 Stationarity test statistics 
Any inference based on critical values in the regression results depends on establishing the 
stationarity of the time series depicted in Figures 1-2. In testing the null that the time series 
are I(1) against the alternative that they are stationary, we must deal with two complications. 
Firstly, all of the series exhibit a clear structural break in late 2000, although the precise date 
of the break is not clear. Some of the series seem to exhibit a break a month or two after the 
onset of the Intifada in October 2000. Secondly, with the exception of the dependent variable, 
the series often take zero values before the break point, so models assuming a Gaussian 
distribution are inappropriate. Techniques for estimating the degree of persistence in censored 
distributions do exist (for example, De Jong, 1997), but these techniques require far more 
observations than we have. 
 In testing for stationarity we take a two-pronged approach. For the dependent variable 
we apply the method of Leybourne et al. (1998), which is used to test for stationarity around a 
smooth transition centred on an unknown breakpoint. That is, we fit the model 
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and then apply a Dickey-Fuller test to the residual ut. Critical values for the resulting t statistic 
are given in the Leybourne et al. paper. The robustness of the result is checked by submitting 
the data to both a standard ADF test and the test of Harvey and Mills (2002), which allows for 
two breakpoints by replacing equation (2) with 
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The two fitted smooth transitions are depicted in Figure 1 above. Table 3 reports the 
stationarity test statistics. If we do not allow for any structural break and apply a standard 
ADF test, then we can reject the null that the series is I(1) only at the 10% level. However, 
applying either the Leybourne et al. test or the Harvey and Mills test, we can reject the null at 
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the 1% level. On balance, there seems to be clear evidence that the series is stationary, at least 
if we allow for a smooth transition. 
We do not use the same method in testing the explanatory variables, because it is 
unrealistic to fit a Gaussian distribution to data before the end of 2000. Instead, we restrict 
attention to the period 2001(1)-2006(6), and apply a standard ADF test to each of the series 
over this period. The results are reported in Table 4. In one case – ln(1 + IFKISR) – the null 
that the series is I(1) can be rejected at only the 10% level, but in all other cases the null can 
be rejected at the 5% level or less. Given that ln(1 + IFKISR) is approximately a linear 
combination of the other variables in the table (with an R2 of 0.97), it seems safe to assume 
that all of the variables are stationary over the period 2001(1)-2006(6). We will further 
assume that the data are also stationary over the period 1997(1)-2000(12), although strictly 
speaking this assumption in untested. 
 
Tables 3-5 here 
 
3.2 The fitted model 
Our main results are presented in Table 5, which lists the steady-state regression coefficients 
in each of the five models, that is, the vector β (1)-1Α (1), along with the corresponding 
standard errors. The full set of regression coefficients is reported in Appendix 2; we use a 
second order lag in β (.) and a first-order lag in Α (.), higher order lags being statistically 
insignificant in all cases. For each model, we report two sets of coefficients. The first set is 
based on the whole sample (after taking lags, this is 1997(2)-2006(6)), and the second is 
based on the years of particularly high violence, 2001(1)-2004(12). The shorter sample is 
chosen for two reasons. First of all, we would like to check whether any of our results are 
sensitive to the structural break in late 2000. Secondly, as shown in Table 2 above, the 
correlations among the explanatory variables are generally very much lower over the shorter 
sample period than they are over the whole sample: there is a large rise in all of the series at 
the end of 2000, but after that the monthly correlation coefficients are not very large. Fitting a 
model to the shorter sample is a way of investigating whether the insignificance of a variable 
in the full sample regression is a consequence of multicollinearity.  
 Before discussing the results of individual models, it is important to note that the 
application of standard model selection criteria, such as the Schwartz-Bayesian Criterion or 
the Akaike Criterion (reported at the bottom of the table), does not reveal any one particular 
model as obviously preferable to the others. This is not surprising, given the high correlations 
among the alternative regressors. Nevertheless, the results of all the models are broadly 
consistent with each other. 
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 Fitting Model 1 to the full sample, we obtain significant negative coefficients on    
ln(1 + PLKWNT), ln(1 + IFKWNT) and ln(1 + IFKNRP). The coefficient on reported Palestinian 
fatalities is -0.26, a figure that remains more or less constant across all the model 
specifications. This implies that a rise in average monthly reported deaths from zero to the 
post-Intifada geometric mean (2.5) will eventually reduce tourist numbers to around 72% of 
their initial value. The corresponding sample means for reported and unreported Israeli deaths 
are 2.0 and 6.8 respectively; the estimated coefficients (-0.13 and -0.17) imply that a 
simultaneous rise in both variables from zero to their respective sample means would 
eventually reduce tourist numbers to 24% of their initial value. However, the coefficients on 
reported and unreported Israeli fatalities are not significantly different from each other, which 
suggests that Israeli fatalities impact on tourist numbers regardless of whether they are 
reported or not. By contrast, the ln(1 + PLKNRP) coefficient is very close to and  
insignificantly different from zero, suggesting that Palestinian fatalities impact on tourist 
numbers only when they are reported. The results for the 2001-2004 sample are broadly 
similar: none of the individual regression coefficients is significantly different from the 
corresponding full sample coefficient; this is a feature common to all of the models. In 
general, our results are robust to restricting the sample to the shorter period. However, the 
short sample ln(1 + IFKNRP) coefficient is insignificantly different from zero, although it is 
still insignificantly different from the ln(1 + IFKWNT) coefficient. 
 The results of Model 2 are consistent with those of Model 1, in that the two significant 
variables are ln(1 + PLKWNT) and ln(1 + IFK): the figures that matter are reported Palestinian 
fatalities and total Israeli fatalities, regardless of whether these are reported or not. Although 
the information criteria for Model 2 are very marginally better, there is no strong evidence 
about which functional form is to be preferred. 
 In Model 3, which disaggregates IFK by location, there are significant negative 
coefficients on both fatalities in the West Bank and Gaza and fatalities west of the Green 
Line. They are significantly different from neither each other nor the coefficient on total 
fatalities in Model 2. This suggests that the location of deaths does not play an important role 
in conditioning tourist perceptions. 
 In Model 4, which disaggregates IFK by the manner of attack, there are significant 
negative coefficients on both deaths in suicide bomb attacks and deaths in other attacks. The 
difference between the two coefficients is marginally significant in the full sample version of 
the model, and in fact the coefficient on ln(1 + IFKOTH) is the larger of the two. This seems to 
contradict the assumption that suicide attack casualties have at least as much impact on tourist 
numbers as other types of casualty. However, one explanation for the relatively small 
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coefficient on ln(1 + IFKSUI) is that it is an imperfect proxy for the number of suicide bomb 
attacks. In the full sample version of Model 5, which replaces ln(1 + IFKSUI) with the number 
of attacks, NSU, the information criteria are very slightly better than in Model 4, although no 
statistical significance can be attached to this difference. The NSU coefficient (-0.13) implies 
that a single suicide bomb attack every month reduces tourist numbers to around 88% of the 
level they would otherwise reach. 
 The dummy variables are statistically significant in all forms of the model. The 
dummy for March 2002 is positive, indicating that the atypically high level of violence in that 
month had a less than proportional effect on tourist numbers. The dummy for October-
November 2000 is negative, indicating that the onset of the Intifada period had a temporary 
negative impact on tourist numbers in addition to the actual and reported casualties at this 
time. The dummy for February-March 2003 is also negative, reflecting the impact of the Gulf 
War on tourist numbers in Israel. In fact, this is the largest single effect of all.7
 Given the absence of a significant media effect in the impact of Israeli casualties, there 
does not seem to be a strong case for arguing that cultivation theory is relevant to television 
reporting of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Still, reports of Palestinian casualties do have a 
large and significant impact; altogether, this suggests that viewers are generally rational and 
well informed, but rely on journalists’ judgement to indicate which events involving 
Palestinian casualties are politically significant.  
 
3.3 Dynamics and model simulation  
Rather than discussing the individual regression coefficients in Appendix 2 in detail, we 
illustrate the dynamic properties of our regressions in Figure 3. This figure depicts results 
implicit in the full sample version of Model 5, but not results from other model. However, the 
stylized facts discussed here also apply to the other models.  The three charts in Figure 3 plot 
the hypothetical response of the dependent variable to a temporary (one-month) increase in 
each of the three statistically significant variables, ln(1 + PLKWNT), ln(1 + IFKOTH) and NSU,  
by one unit. In all three cases, the effect of a temporary increase in actual or reported violence 
is dissipated very quickly. Within four or five months, tourist numbers have recovered to a 
level very close to their starting point (zero in the charts). This means that variations in the 
level of violence – both increases and decreases – are transmitted very quickly into changes in 
the number of tourists. Tourist number dropped very quickly at the start of the Intifada, but 
they have recovered equally quickly during the relative calm of 2005-6. 
 Another way of exploring the dynamics of the model is to simulate counterfactual 
time series for ln(TIS/TEU) under the assumption that (i) there was no reported violence over 
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1997-2006 or (ii) there was no actual or reported violence over this period. Having done so, it 
is possible to calculate the ratio of the hypothetical level of TIS to its actual level in both 
cases. Figure 4 plots the two ratios, based on the full sample coefficients in Model 5. At the 
peak of the violence in 2002, tourist numbers would have been about twice as high if reports 
of Palestinian casualties had been censored. In the absence of any violence, actual or reported, 
tourist numbers would have been about five times as high during this period. More recently 
the intensity of the conflict has been relatively low, and the ratio for no actual or reported 
violence has fallen to around 1.4.  
 
Figures 3-4 here 
 
3.4 Alternative model specifications 8
The interpretation of the results above depends on the assumption that the violence in Israel 
has no effect on American tourism in Europe. Europe has experienced some violence over the 
sample period, and this might be correlated with the intensity of the Arab-Israeli conflict, 
although the level of European violence is tiny in comparison. One way of testing the 
robustness of our conclusions is to replace European tourist data with data from another part 
of the world. For this reason, we compare the results of the Table 5 regressions with a 
corresponding set of results using US tourist departures for Oceania (TOC) in place of TEU. 
Figure 5 illustrates the alternative dependent variable, ln(TIS/TOC). It can be seen that there is 
a high degree of correlation between ln(TIS/TOC) and ln(TIS/TEU), although of course the 
seasonal components of the two series are rather different. Table 6 summarises the results 
from the ln(TIS/TOC) regressions. For each model, the table reports F-tests for the joint 
significance of the conflict variables (excluding the dummies) in the ln(TIS/TOC) regressions, 
and also their joint significance in corresponding regression equations for ln(TEU/TOC). This 
second set of F statistics tests whether changing the numerator in the Israeli tourist regressions 
makes a significant difference to the results. The conflict variables are always significant in 
the ln(TIS/TOC) models, and never significant in the ln(TEU/TOC) models; from this we 
conclude that our results are not being driven by the choice of a particular denominator. 
 
Figure 5 and Table 6 here 
 
We also test whether the addition of reported violence series from other news channels 
makes a significant difference to our results. There are some differences in the reporting of 
the violence across the three major channels. In particular, World News Tonight mentions 
Palestinian casualties more frequently than the other two. Over the period 1997(1)-2006(6), 
World News Tonight mentioned a specific number of Palestinian fatalities in 39.5% of the 
months; the corresponding figure for the CBS Evening News is only 30.7%. Specific numbers 
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of Palestinian deaths were hardly ever mentioned on the NBC Nightly News. When we add to 
Model 2 the number of fatalities reported on the CBS Evening News (that is, the variables  
ln(1 + PLKCBS) and ln(1 + IFKCBS)), these additional variables are jointly and individually 
insignificant, while ln(1 + PLKWNT) remains significant. The same is true of Models 3-5. This 
may reflect the viewing habits of potential tourists: perhaps they take a particular interest in 
the channel that provides the most detailed information about the conflict (the ABC), or in 
local channels taking news feed from the ABC. The theoretical model of Gentzkow and 
Shapiro (2006) shows that a rational Bayesian consumer will give more credibility to a media 
source when it confirms her prior expectations. If potential visitors to Israel have a prior belief 
that it is a dangerous place, then they may well pay particular attention to media outlets that 
give the highest profile to the violence there. 
Finally, we test whether retrospective reports of the violence have an impact on tourist 
figures. Sometimes, the same fatalities are reported on more than one occasion, or a report 
will mention the total number of fatalities over the last few months or years. Such reports are 
relatively infrequent: in the case of World News Tonight, retrospective Palestinian deaths are 
reported in only 11.4% of the months, and retrospective Israeli and foreign deaths in only 
8.8%. Adding these retrospective fatality series to Models 1-5 does not produce significant 
coefficients on the extra variables, and the size and significance of the other variables is 
largely unaffected. Retrospectively reported fatalities constitute a broad, somewhat 
heterogeneous category, and it is possible that greater disaggregation would produce some 
significant coefficients. However, with so few non-zero observations in our sample, it would 
be difficult to disaggregate further without a serious risk of spurious results from data-mining. 
  
4. Conclusion 
Analysis of time-series and cross-sectional Israeli tourist data reveals some of the factors 
driving people’s attitudes towards the risk associated with travel to a conflict region. Time-
series analysis of tourist flows from the United States shows that since the onset of the 
Intifada variations in conflict intensity have affected tourist volumes. These results reinforce 
previous studies of the wider macroeconomic impact of the Intifada, for example Fielding 
(2003) and Eckstein and Tsiddon (2004). As a consequence, we can expect even a partial 
reduction in violent conflict in the region increase tourism revenue. As returning tourists 
boost local incomes they may create stakeholders in the continuation of the peace process. 
This could be grounds for optimism regarding a gradual resolution of the conflict.  
 We find that different dimensions of the conflict have heterogeneous effects on tourist 
flows. There is also heterogeneity with regard to whether it is the actual or reported intensity 
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of a certain dimension of the conflict that matters. An increase in the frequency of actual 
Israeli casualties reduces tourist numbers substantially; conditional on these figures, attacks 
reported on network television channels make no significant difference. By contrast, it is the 
reported number of Palestinian deaths – not the actual number – that causes a decline in 
tourism. Further disaggregation of casualty figures (for example, by location or by the type of 
attack) indicates that attacks of all kinds have a substantial impact on tourist numbers. It is 
possible to square this result with a model of economically rational tourists: for example, 
tourists could rely on the qualitative judgement of journalists to inform them which conflict 
events are the most politically significant. Nevertheless, it does demonstrate that television 
has a substantial impact on economic behaviour.  
 
Notes 
1 As acknowledged in Brück and Wickström (2004), such psychological effects are likely to 
be particularly important when we are modelling people’s responses to risks to life and limb. 
2 By contrast, Burger and Sturm (2005) construct a model of the German macro-economy 
conditional on the number of German television media reports of conflicts around the world. 
However, they do not compare this with a model using actual data from the conflicts that are 
partially reported. 
3 The regression specification here with is similar in spirit to that of Fleischer and Buccola 
(2002), who analyze total foreign demand for Israeli hotel accommodation up to 1999 as a 
function of a single “terror index”, but differs from their model in points of detail. We do not 
find any significant coefficient on economic variables in our regression equation. 
4 NY = 1 if either Rosh Hashanah or Yom Kippur occur in the month; otherwise NY = 0. 
5 One disadvantage of the data that we use is that they include business visitors in the total, 
and this should be noted as a caveat. There are no appropriately disaggregated data available 
at a frequency higher than once every two months. 
6 The B’Tselem data do not cover violence along the Lebanese border, but this area does not 
attract such a large proportion of the foreign tourist market as it does of the domestic one. 
7 The dummy variable for March 2002 is omitted from the model when the 2001-2004 sample 
is used, because it is collinear with the seasonal effects. 
8 We also explored the effect of replacing our measure of the number of American tourists 
visiting Israel with the number of American tourist person nights (indicating the number of 
tourists in Israel times the number of nights they stayed); this time series is also available on 
the CBS website. The correlation between the two alternative dependent variables is 0.98. The 
results using the alternative dependent variable are very similar to the ones reported here; the 
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main difference is in the ln(1 + PLKWNT) coefficients, which are about 3-4 percentage points 
smaller, but still significant at the 5% level. 
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Table 1: Alternative Model Specifications 
 Model 1 
Model 
2 
Model 
3 
Model 
4 
Model 
5 
Reported Palestinian deaths (PLKWNT) ? ? ? ? ? 
Non-reported Palestinian deaths (PLKNRP) ?     
Total Palestinian deaths (PLK)  ? ? ? ? 
Reported Israeli deaths (IFKWNT) ? ? ? ? ? 
Non-reported Israeli deaths (IFKNRP) ?     
Total Israeli deaths (IFK)  ?    
Israeli deaths west of the Green Line (IFKISR)   ?   
Israeli deaths in the West Bank (IFKWBG)   ?   
Israeli deaths: not suicide bombs (IFKOTH)    ? ? 
Israeli deaths: suicide bombs (IFKSUI)    ?  
Number of suicide bomb attacks (NSU)     ? 
 
 
 
Table 2: Selected Correlations across the Explanatory Variables 
The sample is 1997(1)-2006(6). Standard deviations are reported on the main diagonal.  
The figures in parentheses are conditional on an intercept shift in October 2000. 
 ln(1+PLKWNT) ln(1+IFKWNT) ln(1+PLKNRP) ln(1+IFKNRP) 
ln(1+PLKWNT) 1.25 (1.12)    
ln(1+IFKWNT) 0.70 (0.62) 1.15 (1.01)   
ln(1+PLKNRP) 0.42 (0.07) 0.46 (0.12) 1.60 (0.77)  
ln(1+IFKNRP) 0.46 (0.24) 0.40 (0.13) 0.75 (0.42) 1.10 (0.80) 
     
 ln(1+IFKISR) ln(1+IFKWBG) ln(1+IFKOTH) ln(1+IFKSUI) 
ln(1+IFKISR) 1.19 (0.98)    
ln(1+IFKWBG) 0.59 (0.33) 1.06 (0.76)   
ln(1+IFKOTH) 0.62 (0.39) 0.94 (0.88) 1.09 (0.80)  
ln(1+IFKSUI) 0.91 (0.88) 0.56 (0.33) 0.47 (0.19) 1.19 (1.02) 
 
 
 
Table 3: Stationarity Test Statistics for ln(TIS/TEU) 
The sample is 1996(4)-2006(6). 
deterministic components                  ADF t   lags
intercept -2.55 * 2
LNV smooth transition -7.27 *** 1
Harvey & Mills smooth transition -7.54 *** 1
 
*** significant at 1%; * significant at 10%.
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Table 4: Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Statistics for the Explanatory Variables 
All ADF regressions include an intercept and trend. The sample is 2001(1)-2006(6). 
variable                                               ADF t   lags
ln(1+PLKNRP) -4.49 *** 0  
ln(1+IFKNRP) -6.59 *** 1
ln(1+PLK) -4.34 *** 0
ln(1+IFK) -6.34 *** 0
ln(1+IFKISR) -3.06 * 4
ln(1+IFKWBG) -6.79 *** 0
ln(1+IFKOTH) -4.06 ** 0
ln(1+IFKSUI) -3.52 ** 2
 
        *** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10%. 
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 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
 full sample 2001-2004 full sample 2001-2004 full sample 2001-2004 full sample 2001-2004 full sample 2001-2004 
 coeff. t coeff. t coeff. t coeff. t coeff. t coeff. t coeff. t coeff. t coeff. t coeff. t 
ln(1+PLKWNT) -0.26 -3.44 -0.20 -2.77 -0.27 -3.90 -0.16 -2.52 -0.23 -3.74 -0.17 -2.56 -0.22 -3.53 -0.14 -2.43 -0.22 -3.65 -0.18 -2.90 
ln(1+IFKWNT) -0.13 -2.05 -0.17 -2.88 -0.02 -0.23 -0.03 -0.36 0.04 0.64 -0.04 -0.53 0.03 0.42 -0.03 -0.41 0.07 0.94 -0.01 -0.08 
ln(1+PLKNRP) 0.03 0.60 0.09 0.90                 
ln(1+IFKNRP) -0.17 -2.42 -0.10 -1.02                 
ln(1+PLK)     0.04 0.89 0.06 0.63 0.05 1.21 0.04 0.42 0.04 1.03 0.04 0.52 0.02 0.62 0.08 0.80 
ln(1+IFK)     -0.22 -2.86 -0.33 -2.14             
ln(1+IFKISR)         -0.15 -2.45 -0.14 -1.45         
ln(1+IFKWBG)         -0.23 -3.06 -0.16 -1.58         
ln(1+IFKOTH)             -0.25 -3.92 -0.20 -2.46 -0.22 -3.62 -0.12 -1.45 
ln(1+IFKSUI)             -0.11 -1.93 -0.15 -2.33     
NSU                 -0.13 -2.21 -0.12 -1.77 
O/N 2000 -3.02 -3.56   -2.95 -3.71   -2.51 -3.43   -2.39 -3.48   -2.15 -3.33   
Mar 2002 1.41 2.67   1.32 2.67   1.26 2.73   1.21 2.76   2.04 3.68   
F/M 2003 -2.48 -3.64 -1.91 -3.67 -2.22 -3.50 -1.68 -3.54 -2.02 -3.56 -1.76 -3.56 -1.97 -3.49 -1.66 -3.73 -2.19 -4.07 -1.86 -3.95 
                     
R2  0.93  0.95  0.93  0.96  0.94  0.96  0.94  0.96  0.94  0.96 
σ  0.16  0.15  0.16  0.14  0.16  0.15  0.16  0.14  0.16  0.15 
SBC -2.69 -2.46 -2.73 -2.55 -2.70 -2.45 -2.70 -2.54 -2.72 -2.40 
AIC -3.39 -3.51 -3.43 -3.60 -3.45 -3.58 -3.45 -3.67 -3.47 -3.53 
Test statistic p values                    
Autocorr.  0.44  0.83  0.56  0.21  0.41  0.13  0.45   0.21  0.96  0.97 
ARCH  0.15  0.47  0.12  0.35  0.03  0.19  0.03  0.22  0.08  0.88 
Jarque-Bera  0.76  0.76  0.94  0.30  0.78  0.21  0.62  0.15  0.31  0.95 
Heterosked.  0.89    0.96    0.96    0.92    0.97   
Each regression also includes month, Passover and New Year effects. The full sample is 1997(2)-2006(6). 
Table 5: Steady-State Coefficients from the ln(TIS/TEU) Regression Equations 
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Table 6: Joint Significance of the Conflict Variables in the ln(TIS/TOC) and 
ln(TEU/TOC) Regressions 
These figures are the p-values of F-tests for the joint significance of lags of the conflict 
variables. 
 ln(TIS/TOC) ln(TEU/TOC) 
 full sample 2001-2004 full sample 2001-2004 
Model 1 0.000 0.001 0.610 0.996 
Model 2 0.000 0.001 0.433 0.983 
Model 3 0.000 0.003 0.591 0.642 
Model 4 0.000 0.002 0.787 0.947 
Model 5 0.000 0.001 0.418 0.470 
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Figure 1: ln(TIS/TEU) with fitted smooth transitions 
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Figure 2: Selected conflict variables 
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Figure 3: Impulse responses for temporary unit deviations, Model 5 
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Figure 4: Ratios of hypothetical tourist numbers to actual tourist numbers, Model 5 
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Figure 5: ln(TIS/TEU) and ln(TIS/TOC) compared 
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Appendices to Be Made Available on Request 
 
Appendix 1 
Here we discuss the conceptual framework from which equation (1) in the main text is derived. 
This follows a standard discrete choice framework, as can be found in, for example, Maddala 
(1983). Our model concerns a population of American tourists who have already decided to 
take a vacation; now they are deciding where to go. Let the net utility an individual i derives 
from taking a vacation in location m ∈ {1,..., M} in month t be designated vimt. We will assume 
that each person’s utility is of the form: 
 
vimt = μmt (Zmt, εmt) + uimt         (A1) 
 
where μmt is the average level of utility from visiting location m in month t for the vacationing 
population and uimt is an individual’s idiosyncratic deviation from this average. Zmt is a vector 
of identifiable time-varying factors that impact on one’s net utility from a vacation in a 
particular location, and εmt is a stochastic term reflecting the unpredictable component of the 
average utility level. We further assume that individual i chooses location m in period t just if: 
 
vimt = max (vi1t,..., viMt)         (A2) 
 
It can be shown (Maddala, 1983) that if for any two locations (m, n) the distribution of uimt is 
independent of that of  uint, and if each has a Weibull distribution, then the probability of any 
one randomly selected individual choosing location m in period t is: 
 
∑ === Mjj jtmtimtp 1 )exp(
)exp(
μ
μ         (A3) 
 
o
 
r, in logarithmic form: 
∑ ==−= Mjj jtmtimtp 1 )exp(ln)ln( μμ         (A4) 
 
For a large population, the log-ratio of the number of people in period t visiting location m 
(pmt) to the number visiting location n (pnt) can therefore be written as: 
 
ln(pmt / pnt) = μmt (Zmt, εmt) – μnt (Znt, εnt)       (A5) 
 
Location m here is to be interpreted as Israel; location n is to be interpreted as Europe.  If we 
know the functional forms of μmt (.) and μnt (.), then we can fit equation (A5) to time-series 
data. We assume that it is possible to find a linear specification such that: 
 
ln(pmt / pnt) = [Zmt – Znt]′Β + εt        (A6) 
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where εt is a linear function of εmt and εnt. We further assume that [Zmt – Znt] has three major 
components, as follows. 
 
(i) Seasonal factors, which we will capture by a seasonally varying intercept. The seasonality in 
tourism demand in Israel is likely to arise partly from the weather, and partly from its 
desirability a place to be during specific religious festivals. 
 
(ii) Cyclical variation that results from imperfect information about the relative enjoyability of 
Israeli tourist resorts. If some people know more than others about the quality of these resorts 
(for example, because they have been there before), then there is an information externality in 
their decision to go again. Such externalities are likely to create cycles of the kind modelled 
theoretically by Çelen and Kariv (2004). We will capture this effect through the inclusion of a 
lagged dependent variable, which according to the theory ought to have a coefficient in the 
interval [0,1], that is, the time series ought not to exhibit a unit root. Our simple linear model 
is an approximation to the theory. Nevertheless, the main point is that with imperfect 
information there are cycles resulting from herding behaviour, but the herding effect does not 
persist indefinitely. 
 
(iii) The anticipated net disutility arising from violence in Israel. This net disutility is likely to 
be a function of the sense of personal threat facing tourists, but may also reflect political 
sympathy for one side or another in the conflict. Hence, those dimensions of conflict intensity 
related directly to the sense of threat may impact on tourist flows differently from those 
dimensions of conflict intensity that are related only to the sympathy effect. Further, we make 
no a priori assumption about whether tourists react to actual variations in conflict intensity or 
only to variations in the intensity of reporting by a particular television news show. Finally, we 
allow any cultivation effect from awareness of a particular dimension of the conflict (actual or 
reported) to impact on tourist flows with a lag. Hence, equation (A6) is interpreted as a 
dynamic equation of the following form, corresponding to equation (1) in the main text: 
 
β (L) ln(pmt / pnt) =  Α (L) Xt + Σs θ s · hst + φ 1 · PSt + φ 2 · NYt + εt    (A7) 
  
hst is a dummy for month s, PSt and NYt are Jewish holiday dummies and Xt is a vector of 
different measures of actual and reported conflict intensity during the Intifada.  
 Equation (A7) omits any measure of the relative cost of visiting of the two locations. 
Data on hotel and restaurant prices in Europe and Israel are available, facilitating the 
construction of hospitality price real exchange rate series. However, such series are unlikely to 
be exogenous to total tourist volumes, and in this context there is no obvious instrument for 
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hotel and restaurant prices. For this reason we tested for a relative cost effect using an 
aggregate consumer price real exchange rate. Specifically, we used the log of the ratio of the 
Israeli consumer price index to the Euroland consumer price index, scaled by the Shekel-Euro 
nominal exchange rate. Nominal exchange rate and price indices are reported by the Israeli 
Central Bureau of Statistics (www.cbs.gov.il), the Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis 
(http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2) and the European Central Bank (www.ecb.int). Adding a 
real exchange rate term based on these data to equation (A7) produced no statistically 
significant coefficient. Substitution of the (probably endogenous) hospitality price real 
exchange rate for the aggregate consumer price real exchange rate made no difference to the 
insignificance of the relative cost term in the regression equation. 
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   whole sample   2001-2004   whole sample   2001-2004   whole sample   2001-2004   whole sample   2001-2004   whole sample   2001-2004 
    coeff.   t   coeff.   t   coeff.   t   coeff.   t    coeff.   t   coeff.   t   coeff.   t   coeff.     t   coeff.   t   coeff.   t 
ln(TIS/TEU)-1 0.410 4.8 0.188 1.4 0.390 4.6 0.226 1.8 0.358 4.2 0.228 1.8 0.355 4.1 0.184 1.5 0.349 4.1 0.230 1.6 
ln(TIS/TEU)-2 0.138 1.7 0.217 1.8 0.140 1.8 0.161 1.5 0.117 1.5 0.149 1.3 0.123 1.6 0.167 1.6 0.113 1.5 0.129 1.0 
ln(1+PLK WNT ) -0.067 -3.2 -0.055 -2.2 -0.079 -3.9 -0.047 -2.0 -0.074 -3.6 -0.053 -2.2 -0.071 -3.5 -0.049 -2.1 -0.079 -3.7 -0.056 -2.0 
ln(1+PLK WNT )-1 -0.049 -2.3 -0.061 -2.4 -0.048 -2.3 -0.053 -1.9 -0.047 -2.3 -0.050 -1.7 -0.044 -2.1 -0.044 -1.6 -0.042 -2.1 -0.060 -2.0 
ln(1+IFK WNT ) -0.065 -2.6 -0.057 -1.9 -0.049 -1.9 -0.021 -0.6 -0.037 -1.3 -0.014 -0.4 -0.039 -1.4 -0.013 -0.4 -0.004 -0.1 -0.005 -0.1 
ln(1+IFK WNT )-1 0.005 0.2 -0.042 -1.4 0.042 1.6 0.005 0.1 0.059 2.1 -0.011 -0.3 0.053 1.8 -0.004 -0.1 0.039 1.4 0.001 0.0 
ln(1+PLK NRP ) 0.019 0.8 -0.022 -0.3                 
ln(1+PLK NRP )-1 -0.007 -0.3 0.075 1.1                 
ln(1+IFK NRP ) -0.031 -1.2 -0.032 -0.7                 
ln(1+IFK NRP )-1 -0.047 -1.7 -0.026 -0.6                 
ln(1+PLK)     0.029 1.2 0.021 0.4 0.034 1.4 0.002 0.0 0.037 1.6 0.022 0.4 0.036 1.6 0.018 0.3 
ln(1+PLK)-1    -0.010 -0.4 0.013 0.2 -0.009 -0.4 0.023 0.3 -0.016 -0.7 0.006 0.1 -0.024 -1.1 0.030 0.4 
ln(1+IFK)     -0.026 -0.9 -0.121 -1.7             
ln(1+IFK)-1    -0.076 -2.4 -0.081 -1.3             
ln(1+IFK ISR )        -0.029 -1.2 -0.069 -1.8         
ln(1+IFK ISR )-1        -0.051 -2.0 -0.017 -0.4         
ln(1+IFK WBG )        -0.039 -1.2 -0.051 -0.9         
ln(1+IFK WBG )-1        -0.082 -2.5 -0.048 -1.0         
ln(1+IFK OTH )            -0.064 -2.1 -0.077 -1.6 -0.072 -2.5 -0.053 -1.1 
ln(1+IFK OTH )-1            -0.069 -2.2 -0.053 -1.3 -0.047 -1.6 -0.021 -0.5 
ln(1+IFK SUI )            -0.022 -1.0 -0.074 -2.3     
ln(1+IFK SUI )-1            -0.038 -1.5 -0.021 -0.7     
NSU                 -0.060 -2.3 -0.056 -1.5 
NSU-1                 -0.009 -0.5 -0.021 -0.8 
O 2000 -0.473 -2.5   -0.500 -2.6   -0.480 -2.5   -0.432 -2.3   -0.375 -2.0   
N 2000 -0.891 -4.7   -0.889 -4.7   -0.836 -4.2   -0.814 -4.3   -0.783 -4.1   
M 2002 0.637 2.6   0.620 2.6   0.660 2.6   0.634 2.7   1.097 3.4   
F 2003 -0.414 -2.2 -0.472 -2.4 -0.343 -1.9 -0.358 -1.7 -0.332 -1.8 -0.451 -2.0 -0.310 -1.7 -0.394 -1.9 -0.412 -2.4 -0.437 -2.2 
M 2003 -0.707 -3.7 -0.667 -3.2 -0.703 -3.7 -0.673 -3.4 -0.726 -3.7 -0.646 -2.9 -0.719 -3.8 -0.683 -3.5 -0.766 -4.0 -0.757 -3.5 
Appendix 2: The Full Set of Coefficients from the ln(TIS/TEU) Regression Equations 
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